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Abstract We develop a theory of “risky utilities”, i.e. private firms that manage an infrastructure for public
service, and that may be tempted to engage in excessively risky activities, such as reducing maintenance
expenditures (at the risk of provoking a break-down of the system) or in speculation (at the risk of incurring
massive losses it cannot bear). These risky utilities include financial utilities like exchanges, clearinghouses or
payment systems, as well as standard utilities like electricity transmission networks. Continuation of service
is essential, so risky utilities cannot be liquidated. The optimal regulatory contract minimizes the social cost
among the contracts that steer the firm away from risky activities. It is simple and implemented with a
capital (equity) adequacy requirement and a resolution mechanism when that requirement is breached. The
social cost function is explicitly computed and comparative statics can be simply derived.
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1 Introduction
Utilities are private firms that maintain infrastructure for a public service. Classical examples are distribution
networks for electricity, natural gas or water, or generators. Utilities are traditionally considered “safe” in
several dimensions. They are often monitored by public authorities, who are supposed to ensure that the
physical infrastructure is well maintained. They often benefit from the implicit guarantee of the government
should they encounter financial difficulties. They are typically regarded as a safe investment. For example
the US electricity company Con-Edison is renowned for having steadily increased its dividend over the last
40 years.1
Several scandals have recently altered this perception. The California rolling blackouts of 2000-2001
showed that utilities can fail in spectacular ways. Not only can they go bankrupt, as in the case of Pacific
Gas and Electric, but power can altogether stop flowing to users. At the same time Enron’s downfall exposed
speculative activities at the source of both its failure and the California crisis. These events are not unique:
the 2003 American Northeast blackout affected an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million in
eight US states. Its origin is attributed to a lack of pruning of trees, which interfered with the transmission
lines. In 2009, a power line fell to the ground in Kilmore East (Victoria, Australia) and started a fire that
killed 119 people. The ensuing settlement amounted to AUD 500 million; the transmission line had fallen
because of a faulty conductor lacking a protective cap costing $10.
Moreover the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 has renewed interest in the notion of “utility
banking”, i.e. banking activities that are viewed as essential to the economy.2 This notion has lead to
several proposals by Volcker in the US (2010), Vickers in the UK (2011) and Liikanen in the EU (2012)
for (i) separating or at least ring-fencing the “utility” activities of banks from speculative activities such
as proprietary trading and (ii) designating some institutions as systemically significant and thus subject to
enhanced regulatory scrutiny and special resolution processes.3
A consequence of the GFC was the adoption of special regulations for financial institutions whose inter-
ruption of service would entail large social costs. The Dodd-Frank Act introduced the notion of “Financial
Utility”: financial infrastructures that are vital for the US economy, such as securities or derivatives ex-
1 Con Edison investor relations: http://investor.conedison.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61493&p=irol-dividends.
2 In his Guardian article “Taming the financial casino. We need to restore narrow banking – to ensure that risky bets cannot
again jeopardize the utility”, of March 24, 2009, John Kay claimed: “We attached a casino – proprietary trading activity by
banks – to a utility – the payment system, together with the deposits and lending that are essential to the day-to-day functioning
of the non-financial economy.”
3 Goodhart (2013) analyzes in detail why this ring-fencing may be difficult to implement. We will not explore this direction
here.
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changes, large-value payment systems and clearinghouses.4 According to Paul Tucker (Deputy Governor,
Bank of England) the consequence of the failure of such an institution is “mayhem”, as he witnessed in 1987,
when the Hong Kong Futures Exchange clearinghouse failed as a consequence of the stock crash.5 It resulted
in Hong Kong’s futures market and its stock market closing also for a time; the stock market re-opened
45.5% lower. Such a drop erodes the savings and retirements accounts of large fractions of the popula-
tion, and thereby affects their consumption and retirement decisions. It also typically engenders disruptive
liquidity crises.
This article proposes a theory of the regulation of these “Risky Utilities”. Most utilities are already
subject to regulation, but its object is to curb their market power. A vast academic literature has studied
this form of utility regulation starting with Hotelling (1938), Dupuit (1952) and expanded since by Baron
and Myerson (1982), Sappington (1983) and Laffont and Tirole (1986) (see also Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
Instead we lay the emphasis on the problem of risk management.
Our model is general enough to address both the maintenance problems of traditional utilities and the
speculation problems of financial utilities. We label a risky utility any private company that manages an
infrastructure for public service, and that may be tempted to reduce maintenance expenditures (at the risk
of provoking a break-down) or to engage in speculative activities (at the risk of incurring massive losses
it cannot bear). We focus on the “pure” utility problem and capture the notion of a risky utility by three
simple features:
– the company can secretely engage in risky activities (lack of maintenance or speculation) that increase
profit but may provoke huge losses (a catastrophe);
– shut-down would exert large negative externalities, so the firm cannot be liquidated and public authorities
must intervene following the catastrophe;6
– the size of the firm is constant so that we abstract from the questions of investment policy. This fits
public exchanges, clearinghouses and electricity transmission networks.
Public authorities have the power to regulate the company ex ante and restructure it ex post, should a
catastrophe occur. The object of the article is to determine the best regulation contract. To this end we
develop a continuous-time model of risk-taking under moral hazard in that is tractable enough to allow for
a quasi-explicit solution. Comparative statics are then easy to derive.
A regulated firm (the agent) can engage in two types of socially wasteful activities: cash-flow diversion
and risky activities (speculation) that improve short term profitability but may trigger large losses governed
4 As of September 2014 eight entities in the U.S. have been designated Systemically important financial market utilities
(SIFMU).
5 Financial Times, 16 April 2012.
6 A SIFMU is not subject to bankruptcy law and so cannot be liquidated; instead it is to be placed under receivership under
the administration of the FDIC.
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by a Poisson process. The firm is protected by limited liability. An incentive-compatible regulation contract
deters both, and the optimal contract minimizes the social cost of regulation among incentive compatible
contracts. This contract is very simple: it is a termination rule of the incumbent with on sale to new investors.
That intervention is triggered when the value of the firm falls below a threshold; this is interpreted as, and
implemented with, a minimal capital requirement. This threshold corresponds to the lowest continuation
value that deters speculation. Equity here is not meant to absorb losses; it guarantees the owners of the firm
have enough to lose to not speculate. The more efficient is diversion the more attractive is speculation, and
so the more difficult it is to deter. Deterring speculation thus requires a higher equity threshold. So more
efficient cash flow diversion induces a higher social cost (because of the option to speculate).
Our paper is related to four strands of the literature. First, we use the continuous time contracting
techniques as developed by Biais et al (2007,2010), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Sannikov (2008).
They are particularly appropriate in our context: the decision to speculate can be altered at any point in
time, restructuring naturally corresponds to a stopping time and a large loss can arise at any moment with
minute probabilities. The model can be viewed as an extension of DeMarzo, Livdan and Tschistyi (2013).
We depart from this model in several ways; the most notable are: (i) a contract cannot be conditioned on
an exogenous observable event (a crisis), so “relative performance” evaluation is not possible; (ii) we do
not rely on public randomization for termination because of the very large losses. Second, we connect to
the regulation of equity capital. Our optimal contract is implemented with a minimal equity requirement
imposed on the firm, the purpose of which is to ensure the shareholder has enough at stake not to engage in
excessive risk-taking. Furlong and Keeley (1989) establish that asset risk decreases when the capitalization
of a bank increases. Milne (2002) observes that a bank’s portfolio choice depends on its capitalization. Our
model accords well with both; capital requirements induce the institution to choose the less risky path
because breaching the capital requirement triggers restructuring and expropriation. In Diamond and Rajan
(2000) bank capital acts as a buffer against credit losses and thus curtails bank runs by providing depositors
with some insurance. Similarly in Tian, Yang and Zhang (2013) capital buffers protect the banks against
contagion arising from credit losses. That capital may be long-term debt; not so in our model, where it has
to be equity to deter speculation.
Third, the paper is related to the literature on financial structure and risk taking, as in Biais and
Casamatta (1999). They model an agency problem with two actions however the goal is to determine the
optimal financial structure of the firm without externalities. As in our paper, equity is necessary to overcome
the risk-taking problem. We also connect to a more recent literature on bailouts. Zentefis (2014) shows the
nature of the rescue matters: if the institution is burdened by excessively large repayments ex post (as a
debtor, for example) it has incentives to default. In our model there is no default but early intervention
that is final. Panageas (2010) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) show that an implicit guarantee, or more
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capital (respectively), enhances return volatility. This is empirically echoed in Mariathasan, Merrouche and
Werger (2014). Our agent is protected by limited liability and would always like more risk, so an deterrent
must be preemptive.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes incentive compatible regulation contracts and sug-
gests a simple implementation. Section 4 studies the social cost function in details. We present a discussion
in Section 5 and then conclude. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We adapt the model of DeMarzo, Livdan and Tschistyi (2013) to the case of an infrastructure providing a
public service that must be continued in all circumstances. Operating cash flows follow the process
dxt = µ(a)dt+ σdZt −KdNt, (2.1)
where a ∈ {0, 1} and Z ≡ {Zt,Ft; 0 < t < ∞} is a standard Brownian motion associated with a filtration
Ft on a probability space (Ω,F ,P). The action a governs the trend µ(·) and the intensity of the Poisson
process Nt : µ(0) = µ, µ(1) = µ+∆µ and λ(0) = 0, λ(1) = ∆λ. We assume µ > 0, ∆µ > 0.
There are two sources of frictions. First, in the spirit of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) the operating
cash flow at any moment t can be diverted by the shareholder: a dollar diverted brings η ≤ 1 dollars to
the shareholder. Second, the agent can secretely engage in excessively risky (“speculative”) activities that
generate an additional cash-flow ∆µ per unit of time but expose the firm to catastrophic losses K that wipe
it out.7 For example, the firm sells (but does not buy) credit default swaps or options. Or an electricity
network may save ∆µ on its maintenance, and thereby expose itself to network failure governed by the
Poisson process.
The government auctions off the right to operate that infrastructure among a pool of agents (potential
investors/managers) who have limited wealth ω. At any point in time the infrastructure is operated by a
particular investor/manager: the shareholder. There are also passive investors who can participate in the
financing of the infrastructure. All agents are risk-neutral and discount future payments at a common rate r >
0. The shareholder is subject to an exogenous shock (e.g. liquidity shock or investment opportunity) governed
by an independent Poisson process of intensity δ. Whenever hit by this shock the shareholder must divest; the
associated stopping time is τL. This maps well into the fact that investors in public infrastructure do not hold
their assets forever, and that these divestments may occur randomly. Thus restructuring may be triggered
either for exogenous reasons or for insufficient performance. The latter is the contractual restructuring
7 These may be financial losses as experienced during the GFC or social losses associated with business interruption for a
more traditional utility. Then the regulatory contract forces the shareholder to internalize these externalities.
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associated with the stopping time τR. Hence the stopping time τ = τL ∧ τR: it is the minimum of either
stopping time.
A regulation contract Ξ specifies the flow of payment (dividends) dLt to the shareholder, as well as the
termination rule represented by a stopping time τ and a terminal payment wτ . At date τ the firm is restruc-
tured at cost γ: the incumbent shareholder receives a payment wτ and the firm is sold to a new shareholder.
Since the environment is stationary the terms of the new regulation contract Ξ = (L, τ, wτ ) remain the same.
The objective of the government is to minimize the expected present value of the public funds that need to
be expended in order to guarantee the continuity of the service provided by the infrastructure. A regulation
contract is incentive compatible if it is designed in such a way that the shareholder never finds it optimal to
divert cash, nor to engage in speculative activities.
3 The Optimal Contract
Following the recursive approach of Spear and Srivastava (1987) we can characterize any contract by the
stochastic process w describing the continuation payoff of the agent when the contract Ξ is executed. Let
dHt(Ξ, a) = dLt(Ξ, a) + η[dxt(a)− dx̂t(a)]
denote the agent’s consumption process under contract Ξ and strategy a, where she reports dx̂t(a) and when
the actual cash flow is dxt(a). Since the agent cannot save dxt(a) − dx̂t(a) ≥ 0. The agent’s continuation
utility at date t takes the form






hence total utility reads




∣∣∣∣Ft]+ e−rtwt(Ξ, a). (3.2)
Drop the dependence on Ξ for convenience; using the martingale representation theorem the utility Ut(a)














where Nat is a Poisson process of intensity λ(a). Incentive compatible contracts can be directly characterized
by simple conditions on these sensitivity parameters βt and Pt. We now proceed to completely describe these
conditions.
3.1 Incentive compatibility
Recall that the process L of payments to the shareholder satisfies the limited liability constraints dLt ≥ 0
for all t, and wτ ≥ 0. From the definition of wt this implies
wt ≥ 0, ∀t.
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Proposition 1 No cash is diverted if and only if
βt ≥ β ≡ ησ, (3.3)












To deter the agent from diverting funds to her own use, the principal specifies a share βt/σ of cash flows that
the agent can keep. Then she prefers (at least weakly) receiving βtdZt from the principal to appropriating
the usable fraction η of σdZt. Similarly, engaging in speculation generates an additional ∆µ but may trigger
the penalty Pt. Incentive compatibility requires that the flow expected loss from speculation (∆λPt) be at
least as large as the flow expected gain (η∆µ).
3.2 Characterization of the optimal contract
Our first Proposition outlines the set of incentive compatible contracts. Now we turn to the contract that
minimizes the social cost function among all incentive compatible contracts. This social cost function is
explicitly defined in Section 4 but we can already characterize the optimal contract as follows.
Proposition 2 The optimal contract is such that
– Lt ≡ 0 (compensation is deferred to date τ).
– βt ≡ β (minimum cash flow sensitivity that prevents cash diversion);
– Pt ≡ wt (the shareholder is wiped out in case of a catastrophe);8
– τ = τL ∧ τR, where τR = inf{t|wt ≤ wm} (termination occurs at the earliest of the exogenous retirement
and the regulatory intervention threshold for insufficient performance.)
These conditions are easy to interpret. Since government and shareholders have the same discount factor
it never helps to disburse any cash in the form of early (that is, before termination) payments dLt. This
is an extreme form of back-loading payments, in order to provide maximum incentives at minimum cost.
Moreover it is optimal for the government to allow for the smallest fraction βt of the volatile component of
the cash flow dxt−E[dxt] = σdZt to be left to the shareholder. The limited liability constraint on wt implies
that Pt ≤ wt; thus imposing a higher penalty may only trigger earlier restructuring without altering the
shareholder’s incentives. Hence, along the optimal path, wt is subject to the dynamics
dwt = rwtdt+ βdZt.
8 Since catastrophes do not occur along the equilibrium path in this model, any Pt ≥ wm is also optimal.
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The incentives are maximized when Pt ≡ wt: the shareholder must be wiped out after a catastrophe. Any
further penalty would violate limited liability, thus wt ≥ wm is necessary to preserve incentive compatibility.
The firm must be restructured or recapitalized when wt reaches wm.
3.3 Implementation of the optimal contract
In line with Biais , Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet (2007, hereafter BMPR) we implement the optimal contract
using a well-selected financing and cash management policy.9 The fundamental principle underlying this




that stay proportional to the continuation payoff wt. At date 0 the winning bidder (who becomes the
shareholder) invests ω. The firm issues riskless debt (to the passive investors) paying a constant coupon µ,
which is guaranteed by the government; the market value of this debt is therefore µ/r. The government
initially injects
m0 − ω + I + γ −
µ
r
in exchange for a a fraction 1−η of the shares (outside equity).10 Here m0 is the initial level of cash reserves
and I ≥ 0 is the once-and-for-all investment necessary to start the infrastructure, and γ is the cost of
organising the auction. The balance sheet at date t is shown below.
Productive Assets Debt
A D




The value of the productive assets is the expected present value µ/r of the cash flow and thus coincides
with the value of the debt D. This implies that mt ≡ vt: the total value of the equity is always equal to the
cash reserves, because all players have the same discount rate.
Under the optimal contract there is no speculation so the cash reserves of the firm follow the dynamics
dmt = rmtdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest




9 The implementation is not unique. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) suggest an implementation using credit lines instead.







= rmtdt+ σdZt (3.5)
is also a discounted martingale. Restructuring takes place at time τ = τL ∧ τR, where τR is the first time the
cash reserves fall below ∆µ/∆λ – recall mt = wt/η. The government removes the management and looks
for a new shareholder. Nonetheless there is no breach of contract: termination is part of the contract and
the shareholder receives the contractual payment wτ . The net injection of public funds at that time is thus
contingent on wτ . However the social cost of restructuing is independent of these transfers, even if η < 1; it
is simply γ > 0, i.e. the cost of finding a new shareholder.
The total value vt of the equity of the firm, including the shares accruing to the government, is just equal
to mt. The private shareholder holds a fraction η of the equity
wt = ηvt
while the government’s participation is (1− η)vt. Hence the stopping time can also be regarded as the first
time the value of the firm’s equity falls below vm ≡ ∆µ/∆λ. This is a capital adequacy rule.
Remark 1 The optimal contract uses a combination of debt and equity to mitigate the two frictions. Debt
solves the cash diversion problem by appropriating expected earnings µdt. Equity is used to prevent specu-
lation: the minimum capital requirement ensures that the shareholder has enough “skin in the game” to not
engage in excessively risky activities.
Remark 2 Our result is also related to the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). They study
firms-workers relationships when workers can “shirk” but can be detected with some exogenous probability,
in which case they are fired. The efficiency wage is the minimum wage that deters workers from shirking. In
our model, the analogue of the efficiency wage is the minimum market value of equity below which the firm
starts engaging in excessive risk taking. Then its shareholders are “fired”.
From now on we use the equity value vt (≡ mt) as state variable instead of wt (≡ ηvt). This variable
determines the expected cost of public intervention through the cost function C(v) that we now study in
detail.
4 The social cost of public intervention
Here we analyze in detail the determinants of the social cost of restructuring the firm, for which we need
to characterize the social cost function. The cost of public intervention is related to the optimal regulation
contract through the recursive formulation
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where τ = τL ∧ τR, τL is exogenous, independent of Z and follows a Poisson process with intensity δ and τR
is the first time the equity of the firm falls below the threshold vm:
τR = inf {t|vt ≤ vm} .
Finally the value vt of the firm follows a discounted martingale:
dvt = rvtdt+ σdZt. (4.2)
Transfers between the government and shareholders (incumbent and new) do not appear in the social cost
formula (4.1). Since the utility is never discontinued, expected future cash flow amounts to a constant µ/r
that can be ignored (this is paid out to debt holders). Therefore social costs at any point in time t are simply
the expected present value of future restructuring costs. The recursive formulation expresses it as the sum of
the expected present values of the cost of the next restructuring γe−rτ and the continuation cost C(v0)e
−rτ .
The government is constrained by the limited wealth ω = ηv0 of new investors.
4.1 Characterization of the social cost function
We begin by outlining a complete characterization of the function C(v) under the optimal contract. From
the properties of the optimal contract, C(·) satisfies the following differential equation
(r + δ)C(v) = rvC ′(v) +
σ2
2
C ′′(v) + δ[C(v0) + γ], v ≥ vm (4.3)
with boundary conditions







[C(v0) + γ] . (4.5)
The first boundary condition is the optimal termination condition. When vt < vm speculation can no
longer be prevented (by Condition (3.4)). Therefore the firm must be restructured as soon as vt = vm; the




e−rτL (C(v0) + γ)
]
,
that is, the social cost is at least the cost of occasional (exogenously given) restructures when shareholders
divest because of their exogenous shock. Compulsory restructuring may arise before τL but its probability
converges to zero when v → ∞. Because
E
[










r+δ (γ + C(v0))
C(vm) = γ + C(v0) C(v
′
m) = γ + C(v0)




These boundary conditions are not standard: the function C(v) appears on both sides of (4.4) and (4.5).
It is nonetheless possible to show there exists a unique solution C(v).
Proposition 3 When δ ≤ 3r there is a unique solution to the homogenous equation














is the unique solution of the differential equation (4.3) with boundary conditions (4.4) and (4.5). It is de-
creasing and convex on [vm,∞).
The function A(·) can be expressed as a linear combination of confluent hypergeometric functions of the first









































where Γ (·) denotes the Gamma function. Function C(v) is depicted in Figure 1.
The convexity of C(v) is the reason why it is indeed optimal to set the sensitivity βt of the shareholder’s
continuation value wt to its minimum value: βt ≡ ησ. In addition, any early payment to the agent (dLt)
would decrease vt and therefore the survival probability of the firm. Similarly any increase in the penalty
Pt beyond wm increases the probability of restructure; more precisely it triggers a restructure before it is
actually necessary.
11 See Abramowitz and Stegun (1964).
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4.2 Properties of the social cost function
The explicit characterization of the social cost function allows to derive easily several comparative statics
results:
Proposition 4 The social cost of public intervention
1. increases with the minimum capital requirement vm = ∆µ/∆λ;
2. decreases with the wealth ω of potential shareholders;
3. increases with the efficiency η of the cash diversion technology;
4. is proportional to the restructuring cost γ;
Some of these comparative statics deserve commentary. It is easy to see that the social cost decreases with
the initial equity injection v0 = ω/η, which explains why C(·) decreases in ω and increases in η. That C(v)
increases with vm may not be so immediate. These comparative statics are connected, and their impact
relates to Proposition 2. Increasing vm simply increases the frequency of costly restructures.
5 Discussion
The optimal regulation contract can be implemented using an appropriate combination of debt and equity
with an appropriate termination rule. As in other papers, debt has a disciplining effect: it is used to extract
the firm’s free cash flow, which prevents cash diversion. But it is not sufficient and leaves open the problem of
speculation, so equity is necessary too. It takes the form of a minimal equity requirement, which guarantees
that the shareholder keeps enough at stake to not engage in excessive risk-taking. This equity requirement
is complemented with restructuring (which includes expropriation and compensation at market value of the
shareholder) that is triggered every time the capital requirement is violated.
Thus the equity requirement has a quite a different role than the “buffer against losses” often advocated
in the banking regulation literature. Instead of absorbing losses and reducing the cost (and frequency) of
public intervention, a higher capital requirement increases them! The reason is that a higher requirement
vm corresponds to a higher expected return on speculative activities ∆µ/∆λ. Then restructuring is bound
to occur more frequently for any bounded wealth ω (to prevent speculation). It would be cheaper in the
short run for the government to ignore the breach of capital requirement (and possibly only restructure
upon insolvency). But this violates incentive compatibility and therefore is socially too costly. So the capital
requirement can also be seen as necessary to prompt early corrective action. This action must be drastic
here, since social losses can be very large.
Our resolution mechanism is termination and sale to a new shareholder. It very much differs from a
bailout: termination occurs not because of financial distress but to preserve incentive compatibility. Yet it
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guarantees continuation of service, as is socially desirable for SIFMUs and many other utilities. This differs
from the proposals of Tucker (2014), who advocates orderly wind-down of financial utilities in distress. If
these financial utilities are indeed essential, wind-down is not credible and that regulation is toothless.
Monitoring is a standard remedy to moral hazard. Here one has to be careful as to what is monitored.
Monitoring that somehow results in reducing the change ∆µ in the drift is uniformly positive: it reduces the
threshold vm by curtailing the incentives to engage in risky activities. In contrast, monitoring to reduce the
incidence of catastrophes ∆λ is uniformly bad(!). It increases vm in that it is a license to speculate: a large
loss is even less likely. An immediate implication of this model in terms of risk management is that, to the
extent it is possible, it is better to reduce the magnitude of losses (K) than their frequency ∆λ.
6 Conclusion
We have characterized the optimal regulation contract for a “risky utility” in a dynamic model of risk-taking
under moral hazard. The model is relevant for a broad range of applications, ranging from standard utilities
to the newly designated financial utilities. The emphasis is laid on the survival risk of these businesses, and
on the externalities their failure (either financial or operational) generates.
Regulation is needed to alleviate two frictions. Shareholders can divert some of the earnings to their
benefit. They can also engage in excessively risky activities to increase those earnings in the short run at the
expense of catastrophic losses (in the longer term).
The optimal contract can be implemented by an appropriate mix of debt and equity, and a stringent
termination rule. The equity requirement plays a very different role than in standard models of banking
regulation. It is not there to absorb losses but instead to discipline the firm and to trigger “prompt corrective
action” from the government. Preventing regulatory forbearance is thus of primary importance for risky
utilities.
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Appendix
A Some background
In the main text we set aside some technicalities that we develop here. The action a impacts the drift µ(a)dt and the intensity
λ(a) of the Poisson process Nt of losses K. In so doing it generates a probability measure over the path of xt; where not
explicitly stated all expectations are nonetheless taken with respect to that measure. Correspondingly, a contract involves a
FNt -adapted cumulative payment Lt to the shareholder and a FNt -stopping time τR.
B Proofs
Proof (of Proposition 1) Given the contract Ξ and information at t, an agent’s utility under any strategy a is








e−rsdLs(a) + η (dxs(a)− dx̂s(a)) |Ft
]
where dHt(Ξ, a) = dLt(Ξ, a)+η(dxt(a)−dx̂t(a)). We now drop the dependence on Ξ for convenience. At any t, the continuation















Because Ut(a) is a martingale, for some process Pt, utility may also be expressed as


























































The first line is a definition, the second one expresses the gains from departing from a = 0 before time t, the third one is the
martingale representation of the second one. The fourth equality teases out the penalties associated with the strategy a = 1












= 0. So the drift of Ut(a) is given by the sign of∫ t∧τ
0












[dLt(1)− dLt(0) + β (dxt(1)− dxt(0)− dx̂t(1)− dx̂t(0))]
= η [dZt − dZt +∆µ]
= η∆µ
When there is no speculation the dynamics of the utility Ut(a) are given by
dUt(a) = dHt(a) + dwt − rwtdt
and those of Ût(a) by




Equating these two and re-arranging,
dwt = rwtdt− dHt +
βt
σ
dZt − Pt[dNt − λ(a)dt].








with (3.3) binding one has (3.4), which is feasible only when wt ≥ wm by limited liability. When these two constraints are
satisfied the agent prefers to not speculate and to not divert funds either. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 2) Setting Pt > wm is neutral on the firm’s incentives whether to engage in speculation. However recall
that
τ = τL ∧ τR = τL ∧ inf{t|wt = Pt}
for any Pt, and where the equality owes to the limited liability constraint Pt ≤ wt. Clearly τR is decreasing in Pt so that τ is at
least weakly decreasing. The lowest penalty Pt that is compatible with incentive compatibility is ω. Because government and
shareholder discount the future at the same rate r, there is no cost in substituting payments for an increase in the continuation
value wt. There is a strict benefit to doing so since τR = inf{t|wt = Pt}. From the dynamics of the continuation value under
an incentive compatible contract
dwt = rwtdt− dLt + βtdZt, wt ≥ wm
one sees that decreasing dLt correspondingly shifts the trajectory of wt. So it is in the government’s interest to set dLt ≡ 0.
Then under an incentive compatible contract the agent’s utility is
dwt = rwtdt+ βtdZt, wt ≥ wm.
As we show below, social cost is a convex function of ω. Hence the optimal contract involves βt ≡ ησ, the minimum value that
satisfies the incentive compatibility condition. ⊓⊔
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Proof (of Proposition 3) From (4.3), the function C takes the form
(r + δ)C(v) = δ [γ + C(v0)] + c0H0(v) + c1H1(v)
where δ [γ + C(v0)] is a particular solution of the second-order ODE and (H0, H1) are basis of solutions for the homogenous
equation





H0(0) = 1 = H
′
1(0)
H1(0) = 0 = H
′
0(0).
The confluent hypergeometric function of the first kind M(a, b; z) is the unique solution the confluent hypergeometric differential
equation (also called Kummer’s equation)




In the next two Lemmata we construct the basis functions H0 and H1 and show each solves Kummer’s equation.


















































































The proof is complete once we have noted that H0(0) = M(0) = 1 and H′0(0) = 0. ⊓⊔










Proof As in the proof of Lemma 1, differentiate

































































and we note that H1(0) = 0, H′1(0) = M(0) = 1. ⊓⊔
The functions H0, H1 and the boundary conditions (4.4) and (4.5) together give us a determination for the coefficients


















The parameter c can be explicitly computed: any confluent hypergeometric function M(a, b; z) can be expressed as







, z < 0
where Γ (·) is the Gamma function (see Abramovitz and Stegun (1964), Chapter 13, Theorems 13.1.4 and 13.1.5). Forming the




Γ (3/2 + δ/2r)




and since Γ (1/2) =
√







Γ (3/2 + δ/2r)
Γ (1 + δ/2r)
< 0.
confirming that limit exists. Condition (4.4) gives:
δ
r + δ
[γ + C(v0)] + c0 [H0(vm) + cH1(vm)] = γ +
δ
r + δ
[γ + C(v0)] + c0 [H0(v0) + cH1(v0)] ,
which simplifies for c0 as
c0 =
γ
H0(vm)− cH1(vm)− (H0(v0)− cH1(v0))
in terms of the functions now known H0, H1 and exogenous parameters only.
To complete the proof, observe from (4.6) that C′(v) and C′′(v) are proportional to A′(v) and A′′(v), hence C(v) solves
the equation



























It remains to check that




















































Since we can write
A(v) = H0(v) + cH1(v)
the boundary condition






















































Γ (1 + (δ/2r))
− 2
Γ (3/2)




















since Γ (1/2) = 2Γ (3/2). The following terms can be shown to be of order no higher than 1 − 2a − 2 = −1(+δ/r) < 0 for the
function H1(v) and no higher than
1
2
(1 + δ/r)− 2 for the function H0(v), hence the sufficient condition δ < 3r.
Lemma 3 The function A : R+ 7→ R is decreasing convex.
Proof Since A′(v) = H′0(v) + cH
′
1(v), A
′(0) = 0 + c < 0, so A(v) is indeed decreasing in v starting at v = 0. Furthermore, by




at v = 0





Suppose now that A(v) is not monotone. We rule out all cases in turns. First a local maximum with A(v1) > 0 is impossible
for then we must have A(v1) > 0, A′(v1) = 0 and A′′(v1) < 0, which contradicts (B.8). Second, a local minimum v2 with
A(v2) > 0 is also impossible: at v2, A′′(v2) > 0 and so there must be a local maximiser v3 with A(v3) > 0; we just ruled that
out. Third, there cannot be an inflexion point with A(v1) > 0 for then A′′(v1) = 0, which is again impossible by (B.8). Fourth,
it cannot reach a local minimum v3 where A(v3) < 0, for then we must have A(v3) < 0, A′(v1) = 0 and A′′(v3) > 0. Again
this is impossible by (B.8). Fifth, an inflexion point below 0 is impossible for then A′′(v1) = 0. Last, a local maximum with
A(v4) < 0 can also be ruled out: if so, there must be a local minimum with A(v5) < 0, which was just shown to be impossible.
⊓⊔













since v0 > vm, and it follows that C(v) is also decreasing convex. Finally together both this definition and the boundary
condition (4.4) tell us that
































which is clearly increasing in vm since A(·) is decreasing. The terms ω and η only appear in the definition of v0 = ω/η. Since
C(·) is clearly decreasing in v0, it is also decreasing in ω and increasing in η. This concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
References
1. Abramowitz, Milton and Irene Stegun (1964) “Handbook of Mathematical Functions with Formulas, Graphs, and Mathe-
matical Tables.”, New York: Dover Publications.
2. Baron, David and Roger Myerson (1982) “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.”Econometrica, Vol 50, pp. 911-30.
3. Biais, Bruno, Thomas Mariotti, Guillaume Plantin and J.-C. Rochet (2007) “Dynamic security design: convergence to
continuous time and asset pricing implications. ”Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 74, pp. 345-390
4. Biais, Bruno, Thomas Mariotti, J.-C. Rochet and Stephane Villeneuve (2010) “Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic
Moral Hazard ”Econometrica, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 73–118
5. DeMarzo, Peter, Dmitriy Livdan and Alexei Tchistyi (2013) “Risking Other People’s Money: Gambling, Limited Liability,
and Optimal Incentives ”minmeo, Stanford GSB,
20 Jean-Charles Rochet, Guillaume Roger
6. DeMarzo, Peter and Yuliy Sannikov (2006) “Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time
Agency Model. ”Journal of Finance, Vol. LXI, No. 6, pp. 2681-2724
7. Diamond, D. W. and Raghuram G. Rajan (2000) “A theory of bank capital.”The Journal of Finance, Vol 55 (6) pp
24312465
8. Dupuit, Jean (1952) “On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works.”, International Economics Papers, 2, 83-110
(translated by R. H. Barback from “de la Mesure de l’Utilite des Travaux Publics,”Annales des Ponts et Chaussees, 2nd
Series, Vol. 8, 1844).
9. Furlong, Frederick and Michael Keeley (1989)“Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: a note.”, Journal of Banking and
Finance, Vol 13 (6), pp. 883-891.
10. Goodhart, Charles A.E. (2013) “The Optimal Financial Structure”, Special Paper 220, LSE Financial Markets Group Paper
Series (March)
11. Hotelling, Harold (1938) “The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility
Rates.”Econometrica, Vol. 6, No 3, pp. 242-269.
12. Kacperczyk, M. and Philipp Schnabl (2013) “How safe are money market funds?”The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 128 (3), pp 10731122.
13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1986) “Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms.”Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 614-641
14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1993) “A theory of incentives in Procurement and Regulation.”Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 614-641
15. Liikanen, Erkki (Chairman) (2012) “High-level expert group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector.”European
Commission, Brussels, Belgium
16. Mariathasan, Michael, Ouarda Merrouche and Charlotte Werger (2014) “Bailouts and moral hazard: how implicit govern-
ment guarantees affect financial stability. ”CAREFIN Working Paper 2/2014, Bocconi
17. Milne, Alistair (2002) “Bank capital regulation as an incentive mechanism: implications for portfolio choice. ”Journal of
banking and finance, Vol. 26, pp. 1-23
18. Panageas, S. (2010)“Bailouts, the incentive to manage risk, and financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics,”Vol. 95
pp 296311.
19. Sannikov, Yuliy (2008) “A continuous-time version of the Principal-Agent problem ”Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 75,
No 3, pp. 957-984
20. Sappington, David (1983) “Optimal regulation of a multiproduct monopoly with unknown technological capabilities.”Bell
Journal of Economics 14, pp. 453-463
21. Saunders, Anthony, Elizabeth Strock and Nickolaos G. Travlos (1990) “Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk
Taking. ”The Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, No 2, pp. 643-654
22. Shapiro, Carl and Joseph Stiglitz (1984)“Equilibrium unemployment as worker disciplining device ”American Economic
Review, Vol. 74, No 3, pp. 433-444.
23. Spear, Stephen and Sanjay Srivastava (1987) “On repeated moral hazard with discounting.”Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 54, pp. 599-617.
24. Tian, S., Yunhong Yang, and Gaiyan Zhang (2013) “Bank capital, interbank contagion, and bailout policy.”Journal of
Banking & Finance, Vol 37(8) pp 27652778
25. Tucker, P. (2014) “Are clearing houses the new central banks?”Transcript, Over-the-counter derivative symposium, Chicago,
11 April 2014
26. Vickers, John (Chairman) (2011) “Independent commission on banking: final report. ”House of Commons Treasury Com-
mittee, London, UK
Risky Utilities 21
27. Volker, Paul (2010) “How to Reform Our Financial System.”The New York Times, January 30, 2010
28. Weare, C. (2003) “The California Electricity Crisis: Causes and Policy Options.”San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of
California. ISBN 1-58213-064-7.
29. Zentefis, Alexander K. (2014) “Risk-taking under a punishing bailout. ”Mimeo, The University of Chicago Booth School of
Business.
